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Michaele Völler b, Finbarr Murphy a, Irini Furxhi a, Martin Cunneen a, Martin Mullins a 
a Emerging Risk Group, Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick, Ireland 
b Institute for Insurance Studies, TH Köln, Germany   








A B S T R A C T   
On the path to high-level vehicle automation, the degree of surveillance both inside and outside the car increases 
significantly. Consequently, ethical considerations are becoming central to questions around surveillance regimes 
and data privacy implicit in level 3 and 4 vehicle automation. In this paper, we focus on outputs from the EU 
Horizon 2020 project Vision Inspired Driver Assistance Systems (VI-DAS). In particular, we assess the VI-DAS 
720-degree observation technology, critical to ensuring a safe Human Machine Interaction (HMI), from multi-
ple theoretical perspectives to contribute to a better understanding of the phenomena of privacy. As a synonym 
for surveillance, we started our evaluation with Bentham’s ideation of the panopticon. From there, it is a rela-
tively short step to radical Foucauldian critiques that offered more dystopian technologies of power. However, 
both theorems demonstrate a limited understanding of the issue of data privacy in the context of safe trans-
portation along the evolution of highly automated vehicles. Thus, to allow the debate to move beyond more 
binary discussions on privacy versus control/power and to a certain degree escape the shadow of the panopticon, 
we applied the Nissenbaum four theses framework of Contextual Integrity (CI). Her decision heuristic allowed us 
to introduce structure and a degree of precision in our thinking on the matter of privacy that represents a step 
forward to phenomena of privacy in a specific context. Our approach concludes that the VI-DAS 720-degree 
observation technology can respect the user’s privacy through an appropriate flow of personal information. 
However, the flows of personal data must be strongly regulated to ensure that data is seen as a value in terms of a 
commodity to protect human life and not seen as an asset that needs to be turned into value in terms of capital or 
the facilitation of asymmetric power-relations.   
1. Introduction 
There is a growing body of literature on the evolution towards 
automated driving. It recognises the transition through the various 
levels of automation as significant steps along the path towards fully 
autonomous vehicles. Recent technological developments point to an 
imminent move from level 2 to levels 3 and 4 vehicles. The latter 
automation levels can be characterised by a shared responsibility for the 
driving task between the human and the machine. This hybrid human- 
machine decision making implies that we will need to see the develop-
ment of shared liability regimes in order for risk transfer protocols 
around private transportation to remain operative. There is a great deal 
of complexity pertinent to this phase of technological roll-out and a 
number of European Union funded projects in the transport realm are 
partly focused on the multiple challenges that we face in finding a so-
lution. One of these projects is the EU Horizon 2020 Vision Inspired 
Driver Assistance Systems (VI-DAS) project (VI-DAS, n.d.); [1], which 
sought to examine and solve the various problems that arise from 
Human Machine Interactions (HMI). 
More specifically, the VI-DAS project aims to establish an enhanced 
driving scenario modelling and risk evaluation for level 3 to 4 vehicle 
automation. The suggested solution to the problem of a mix of human 
agency and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in these levels is the idea of 720- 
degree observation. That is to say, a complete level of surveillance both 
360-degree within and 360-degree outside the vehicle. On the outside, 
cameras and a LIDAR sensor provide the necessary data for the vehicle to 
navigate the road system whereas on the inside, cameras are mounted to 
collect critical data about human behaviour and in particular the 
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readiness of the human driver to resume the control function. The data 
inputs are processed by on-board computers that use machine-learning 
techniques to model the driving environment and generate an in- 
depth understanding of the driving situation. A key driver of in-cab 
surveillance is to be found at phase 8 (see Fig. 1) where the vehicle 
cedes control to the driver. 
In order for this transfer to occur, the vehicle has to know whether 
the driver is ready to take back control. The VI-DAS project posits the 
idea of a camera located over the dashboard, which is able to scan both 
the face and the body position of the driver to determine the driver state 
and readiness to take back the driving task. Therefore, the cameras are 
constantly gathering data on the user and with the addition of some 
relatively straightforward upgrades could generate a stream of bio-
metric data. In the near future, a mass-production car would be able to 
measure or detect tiredness, attention span, alcohol or drug use, and 
underlying medical issues. In addition, the 720-degree capture of the 
inside and the outside allows for a triangulation of data sets that could 
capture not only biometric data but also behavioural traits. In such a 
situation, aggressiveness and passiveness whilst driving become 
measurable as does the propensity to break the law. 
Despite several safety benefits, the idea of 720-degree observation 
posed by the VI-DAS project illustrates that there is virtually no limit to 
the type and amount of data that can be captured, analysed and stored 
[3,4]. Nearly every behaviour can be monitored and carefully scruti-
nized [5]. Apart from that, once information about behavioural traits 
and the driving environment has been collected, it may be persistently 
available for a variety of stakeholder that may be afforded access to this 
lake of private information [6] [7]. From there, fragments of informa-
tion can be easily detached from its original context. One interpretation 
is that the targeted employment of big data analytics allows “strangers” 
to generate comprehensive insights about individual lives [5,8]. As a 
result, we may run into danger that others use that information to exert 
influence in a covert and manipulative way that threatens our ability to 
reflect on and decide independently about our own behaviour [9]. They 
can claim this massive flow of personal information as free raw material 
generated from us but not for us and exert control, power and limit 
freedom [4,10][11] [7]. With that in mind, it becomes vital to not only 
consider the potential value of 720-degree observation but to under-
stand ethical connotations related to data privacy and surveillance. 
The notion of privacy is a concept that already had appeared in 1890 
[12]. From a modern perspective, it can be denoted as the ability of 
people to determine for themselves when, how and to what extend their 
personal information is accessed by others [13]. In this context, it is 
interesting to juxtapose Paterson’s [14] characterisation of the auto-
mobile as a private space, a symbol of freedom, and a refuge from the 
outside world with automated and semi-automated cars. The different 
perceptions are striking: the automobile as a private space and a symbol 
of freedom on the one hand and a machine equipped to capture and 
assess in detail the behavioural traits of the driver on the other. It is easy 
to see why people often refer to the current employment of surveillance 
technologies within the car (i.e. motor telematics1) as a spy, big brother, 
or a stalking system [15]. Apart from this perception of surveillance 
technologies, among researchers, a frequently used metaphor related to 
the issue of privacy and surveillance is the “panopticon”. This raises the 
question of whether the substantial body of literature on Benthamite and 
Foucauldian panoptical thinking helps us to understand this endanger-
ment of our privacy by the widespread employment of 720-degree 
observation. 
According to Bentham’s idea, the panopticon denotes an 
architectural design that makes a comprehensive monitoring of people 
feasible. Complex supervisory procedures supplement the architecture. 
Bringing both together, Bentham created a continuous spectre of sur-
veillance coupled with a realisation that people within the panopticon 
are effectively forced to adapt their own behaviour to the given stan-
dards [16]. All versions of the panopticon manifest modifications that 
are targeted at solving social and political problems at that time to 
maximise pleasure and minimise pain in society [16]. However, this 
approach of total information collection motivated Foucault to study 
Bentham’s panoptical idea in his research on the relationship between 
power and knowledge and expanded it into the concept of panopticism 
[16,17]. According to the concept of panopticism Bentham’s panopticon 
is a laboratory of power that is applied in the form of continuous indi-
vidual supervision with control, punishment, compensation and 
correction of individual misbehaviour. Large-scale control is realised by 
an infinite, invisible power seeing everything and everyone at all time 
[18]. In his view, the disciplining power construct of the 
prison-panopticon has already been realised in many aspects of Western 
societies with technologies as instruments of surveillance that create 
respective norms of behaviour and limit freedom [19–21]. Foucault use 
of the terms technologies or techne refers to a set of practices that emerge 
in a given society and not necessarily to any technological artefact. 
The flows of personal information from the cab of the vehicle are 
driven by sets of professional practices which may not have an explicit 
political agenda but nevertheless create regimes where power relations 
change. The presence of certain institutions as potential end users of the 
newly available data does suggest the creation of a new, more intense 
element of control that does chime with Foucauldian ideas of disci-
plinary power. However, although Foucault’s theorem is an interesting 
starting point from which to interrogate these practices, we should not 
lose sight of the positive side effects of a purposeful data collection 
employing 720-degree observation. In certain contexts, society may 
even determine that a specific information flow is reasonable and crit-
ical for societal welfare. This has prompted European policy-makers to 
discuss which institutions should be able to access the data in the first 
place [22]. Current Benthamite and Foucauldian discussions of data 
privacy and surveillance are too general to allow us to understand who 
should have access to the data recorded through 720-degree observa-
tion. What might be useful in this regard is to follow what Vallor [23] 
has termed an “empirical turn” in the field of technological ethics which 
looks at specific cases to tease out the moral issues in play. We need a 
more robust framework that helps us to specify the question of access to 
data streams in order to optimize HMI, thereby improving the security of 
automated vehicles. 
Consequently, in this paper we argue for a new way of thinking that 
is based on well-established privacy theorems but also one that allows 
the debate to move beyond more binary discussions on privacy and 
partly escapes the shadow of the panopticon. Nissenbaum’s concept of 
contextual integrity (CI) offers a step forward in this regard [24]. She 
claims that the originally used narrow definition of privacy falls short 
and, going forward, the theory of privacy should not primarily be con-
cerned with information flow but rather the appropriateness of these 
data flows. Accordingly, instead of taking the view that individuals must 
have full control over the information use, the key question to be 
answered is whether the information flows are appropriate or not [25]. 
However, the latter, is not solely measured according to the benefit of 
the individual and factors in historically evolved values and informa-
tional norms [24]. In the context of level 3 and 4 vehicle automation, the 
acquisition and (correct) processing of the driver status may lead to 
relevant societal benefits such as improved safety, a reduction of emis-
sions and fuel consumption, and advances in overall traffic flows. Such 
benefits need to factored in to any ethical analysis of such practices to 
allow for socially responsible data usage [26]. 
Nissenbaum’s approach is to some extent reflected in the structure of 
the VI-DAS project in which capturing the views of multiple stake-
holders is built into the architecture of the research consortium. The 
1 A technological device employed in the car to gather comprehensive data 
about the driving behaviour of a person (e.g. distance driven, acceleration, 
braking). In the insurance industry motor telematics is used to calculate indi-
vidual insurance premiums and to provide feedback to the driver on how to 
improve safe driving behaviour. 
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need for robust, multi-perspective governance regimes has also been 
accounted for in the VI-DAS proposal. The consortium is a hybrid of 
technically orientated partners that include a number of blue-chip 
technology2 companies and academic institutions specialising in 
applied ethics and governance. Any solution to the issue of surveillance 
in regimes of shared responsibility and liability requires an acceptance 
of the two-way flow between ideas around best practice in terms of 
ethics and good governance and the trajectory of technological devel-
opment. Therefore, this paper is structured in the following manner: The 
first section of this paper expounds on the state-of-the-art implementa-
tion of surveillance related technologies. Thereby we also capture 
Benthamite/Foucauldian understanding of surveillance regimes and 
their limitations as it relates to the roll-out of autonomous vehicle 
technologies. This is followed by an examination of Nissenbaum’s four 
theses of her framework of CI that seeks to weigh up the utility of her 
decision heuristic in the context of vehicle automation. With Nissen-
baum’s four theses as a starting point, we then work through the prac-
tical case scenario of the hand-over and take-over scenario enabled by 
the VI-DAS 720-degree observation technology. Thereby we aim to more 
fully explain the framework and assess the issue of data privacy in a real- 
case-scenario to broaden the ethical discussion around 720-degree 
observation and interrogate the concept of privacy. 
2. Background 
In recent years, much effort hast been devoted to sensors that allow 
monitoring of the exterior of a vehicle for the development of advanced 
driver assistance systems (ADAS) such as forward collision warning. 
However, we are facing a transition from a car driven by a human to the 
autonomous vehicle and this transition is characterised by a shared re-
sponsibility for the driving task evident in the levels 3 and 4 of vehicle 
automation. In this phase, the human and the machine must comple-
ment each other’s capabilities to operate the vehicle safely. Therefore, 
behavioural traits of the driver must be monitored and analysed to 
provide the right conditions for the take-over of control. For this reason, 
the VI-DAS project proposes a novel 720-degree observation approach 
that allows the gathering of data from inside and outside of the vehicle. 
Apart from external sensors, the VI-DAS project uses non-intrusive 
sensors3 within the cabin to gather real-time information about 
drivers’ behaviour and state of attention. Coupled with the external 
sensors, every individual driving situation can be understood and the 
modes of transition can be adapted to the individual characteristics of a 
driver to ensure a prompt resumption of control. 
In the following passages, we provide some background on the 
technical advancements, focussing on the area of driver monitoring to 
establish a necessary backdrop and to contextualise the following sec-
tions. Technology has made great strides in developing a functional 
autonomous vehicle. Standardised classifications have followed in an 
attempt to map the increasing level of responsibility being placed on the 
vehicle for driving duties [27]. These classifications are measured on a 
scale of 0–5 and are represented in Fig. 2. Levels 0 to 2 largely represent 
manual driving, with level 2 vehicles offering risk reductions through 
taking on tasks that assist the driver in avoiding or mitigating anomalous 
events or impending crashes [28,29]. Levels 3 to 5 place significant 
emphasis on the ‘machine’ element of semi-autonomous vehicle. 
Whereas level 5 represents full automation, level 3 and level 4 indicate 
conditional automation and high automation respectively. 
Semi-autonomous vehicles at these levels can provide significant 
reduction in the number of anomalous events that would otherwise be 
present during manual driving [30]. McCall et al. [31] note that level 4 
liability remains quite vague, as details of a ‘minimised risk condition’ is 
not expanded upon in situations where the driver is unable to retake 
control. Existing legislation regarding automated vehicle’s try to close 
this gap by positing a strict liability of the part of the owner to ensure 
victim protection [32]. 
Although high levels of autonomy are expected to introduce an 
increased level of safety, difficulties may arise in situations where 
Fig. 1. Shared responsibility in level 3 and 4 vehicle automation [2].  
2 Blue-chip technologies are industrial and embedded computing solutions 
for a diverse range of applications. 
3 Non-intrusive human behaviour sensors are sensors that gather information 
about the human being but do not need to have a connection to the human 
body. 
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smooth handovers between driver and vehicle are not achieved. The 
driver must remain alert and receptive of commands to engage in a 
handover sequence to retake control of the vehicle in scenarios such as 
in adverse weather conditions. As such, driver distraction, or “a diver-
sion away from activities critical for safe driving toward a competing 
activity” is a significant hurdle that must be crossed by vehicles along 
the SAE International [27] scale [34]. Optimised HMI environments and 
handover procedures are imperative to the development of level 3 and 
level 4 vehicles, especially given that 9% of U.S. fatal crashes in 2017 
were reported as distraction-affected crashes [35]. Furthermore, drivers 
can potentially become more inattentive as they become more reliant on 
automated functions [36]. This over-reliance on systems is critical 
because drivers tend to trust the automated functions to an unjustified 
extent leading to serious accidents [37,38]. 
A number of analyses have been conducted to examine the reaction 
times and attentiveness of drivers upon the initiation of an impending 
handover task, with the goal of implementing an optimal strategy of 
alert signals and placement to ensure a smooth transition. Trask, Stew-
art, Kerwin, and Midlam-Mohler [39] found that distracted drivers that 
were pre-engaged to a secondary task with two hands responded more 
quickly to audio warnings, while visual and speech warnings did not 
elicit fast reactions and were seen as ineffective and frustrating. Reac-
tion times also decreased the longer the participants were in the study, 
suggesting that drivers quickly adapt to the takeover signals and 
thereafter retain an adequate level of attentiveness. To overcome the 
issue of cognitive and affective loads, van der Heiden, Iqbal, and Janssen 
[40] suggest the use of pre-alerts prior to engaging in the handover event 
from vehicle to human, as it allows the driver time to disengage from 
their secondary task and regain situational awareness, while reducing 
mental workload and stress from the request event. They additionally 
demonstrated that an increasing pulse alert4 is more beneficial since it 
conveys an additional level of urgency. 
In addition to providing a smooth handover in situations where the 
vehicle cannot guarantee occupant safety, level 3 and 4 vehicles may 
also need to be prepared to take over the responsibility of driving duties 
when the driver is continually inattentive or otherwise impaired. The 
National Centre for Statistics and Analysis [35] indicate that driver 
distraction is one subset of inattentiveness, which can also extend to 
fatigue, as well as physical and emotional conditions of the driver. Ryan 
et al. [30] show that both aggressive and drowsy drivers record signif-
icantly more adverse events than drivers in a ‘normal’ state. Purucker, 
Naujoks, Prill, and Neukum [41] address the distraction potential of 
increasingly complex in-vehicle information systems (IVIS). Menial 
tasks related to mobile phone, navigation and sound devices regularly 
attained ‘Eyes-Off-Road’ (EOR) times of greater than 10 s, with standard 
deviations greater than 10 s in tasks related to song selection and address 
entry. Zeeb, Buchner, and Schrauf [42] establish that drivers with erratic 
EOR patterns were high risk on the basis of increased reaction times and 
lower situational awareness when faced with a takeover event. 
Furthermore, Vicente et al. [43] attained a 95% success rate in a 
real-time EOR gaze tracking system. The introduction of such a system 
would enable level 3 and level 4 semi-autonomous vehicles to send 
alerts to the driver or initiate takeover control if full attention is not 
restored. 
Similar to Takahashi’s et al. [44] approach, the VI-DAS project uses a 
camera to monitor the user of a level 3 or 4 vehicle. However, it 
extended the monitoring of the driver by implementing an external view 
which makes a 720-degree observation feasible. This results in a trian-
gulation of data sets which cover not only biometric data but behav-
ioural traits to assess the overall situational ability of a driver to take 
over control. Associated with that is the flow of personal data constantly 
gathered due to the surveillance of the driver which does pose question 
around the individual’s privacy. 
Surveillance or in modern parlance dataveillance denotes the “sys-
tematic monitoring of people’s actions or communications through the 
application of information technology” [45]. In the context of the 
VI-DAS project, the applied information technology are camera sensors 
that allow a 720-degree observation of the driving environment inside 
Fig. 2. Levels of Driving Automation and shift in responsibilities [27,33].  
4 Beeps are given throughout the 20 s pre-alert time before engaging in the 
handover event. 
T. Jannusch et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Technology in Society 66 (2021) 101667
5
and outside the vehicle. Privacy characterises the right to determine for 
ourselves when, how and to what extend personal information is 
collected and accessed by others [13]. The juxtaposition of both defi-
nitions show that the issue of surveillance goes hand in hand with the 
issue of privacy [46]. In the first place, it is the act of monitoring our 
behaviour within the cabin that allows others to gather a multitude of 
personal information. From there it is only a short step to the intrusion of 
our privacy realised when we lose the right to determine when, how and 
to what extent our data can be accessed. Due to their strong interrela-
tion, multi theoretical perspectives are critical to achieve a compre-
hensive understanding of the issues of surveillance and privacy as well 
as their positive aspects in the context of the “VI-DAS car”. 
Bentham’s thinking on the panopticon has attracted considerable 
attention and can almost be classified as a synonym of surveillance [47]. 
For this reason, it constitutes a promising starting point to get an initial 
understanding about whether we can talk about surveillance in the 
context of the 720-degree monitoring scheme implemented in the 
“VI-DAS car”. There are at least four versions of Bentham’s panopticon 
targeted on solving a specific social or political issue of that time: the 
prison panopticon [48], the pauper panopticon [49], the chrestomathic 
panopticon [50], and the constitutional panopticon [16]. However, in a 
concise manner Bentham’s panoptical idea is a targeted architectural 
design supplemented by supervisory procedures to achieve a constant 
feeling of being watched for those inside the panopticon. The purpose of 
this constant feeling of surveillance is to get people within the pan-
opticon to discipline themselves for societal well-being. The prison 
panopticon is the most prominent among Bentham’s theorems and a 
good example to understand how the panopticon works. Inmates are 
securely kept under lock and key in their prison cells whereby the main 
feature of the prison is a circular building at the heart of the complex 
that allows observation all prison cells. There is an inspector in the 
central building who monitors the activities of the inmates at all time. 
However, as one inspector cannot observe all inmates at the same time, 
Bentham decided to locate the inspector in the dark. This special 
element of the prison panopticon creates a constant feeling of surveil-
lance because the inspector appears invisible and all seeing. 
With some exceptions, the “VI-DAS car” can be seen as a modern 
form of Bentham’s panopticon. The panoptical gaze is limited to the 
driving environment. Thus surveillance is omniscient in the context of 
driving but not in the outside world. Within the cabin, cameras observe 
every behaviour of the driver. Hense, users of the “VI-DAS car” might 
perceive the camera functioning as an all seeing and omnipresent 
inspector comparable to the inspector highlighted in the prison pan-
opticon. Yet, by contrast to Bentham’s surveillance machine, the eyes of 
the VI-DAS inspector (i.e. cameras) are visible for the driver. In addition, 
VI-DAS calls the user’s attention to the constant use of the integrated 
720-degree surveillance right before the user starts to operate the car. In 
the context of the “VI-DAS car”, the 720-degree surveillance is designed 
to solve a critical problem along aid the evolution of highly automated 
vehicles. When the driver and the vehicle are both responsible for the 
operation of the car, a faulty HMI can significantly increase the proba-
bility of a crash event. That might be comparable to Bentham’s moti-
vation to employ surveillance elements to solve political and social 
problems related to that time. Lastly, there are two particular differences 
between Bentham’s and the VI-DAS panopticon. In contrast to Ben-
tham’s scheme, surveillance elements within the VI-DAS panopticon are 
not employed to create a constant feeling of being watched to get the 
users to discipline themselves. Rather in order not to endanger the driver 
or other road users, it is crucial that the vehicle understands when the 
human user is distracted and cannot take over the driving task. 
Furthermore, Bentham’s panopticon is limited to one locus of power that 
gathers, processes and stores all information whereby no third party can 
necessarily access that data. Compared with this, the “VI-DAS car” is 
characterised by multiple panopticons crossing each other due to the 
large and complex network of stakeholders where data sharing becomes 
commonplace. That poses concerns about the use and potential abuse of 
data that can only be addressed by Foucauldian thinking of power 
relations. 
Foucault was one of the most influential and cited thinkers of his 
time. He acknowledged Bentham’s idea of the panopticon in his research 
on the relationship between power and knowledge and expanded it into 
the concept of “panopticism” [16,17]. According to Foucault, Bentham’s 
panopticon can be seen as laboratory of power that is applied in the form 
of continuous individual supervision with control, punishment, 
compensation and correction of individual misbehaviour. Large-scale 
control is realised by a central, infinite, invisible power seeing every-
thing and everyone [18]. In Foucault’s view, the disciplining power 
construct of the panopticon has already been realised in many aspects of 
societies with technologies, such as cameras, as instruments of surveil-
lance [19–21]. According to Foucault that omniscient disciplining 
power creates respective norms of behaviour that turn people into 
“marionettes of power”. 
Like Bentham’s architectural thinking, Foucault’s research on power 
relations is critical to the VI-DAS project. It allows us to factor in the 
negative side effects of surveillance for individuals and the whole of 
society. Considering the disciplining power of the panopticon, one could 
argue that people who do not meet the ideal driver behaviour expected 
from the system, get punished in a sense that the vehicle will not hand 
over the control. However, in terms of lighter distractions, users might 
feel a deprivation of freedom by the emerging automation technology. 
Putting it into Foucault’s line of thoughts, this characterises a supervi-
sion in the form of control, punishment, compensation and correction of 
individual misbehaviour. Subsequently, the disciplining power 
empowered by VI-DAS 720-degree observation can limit human 
freedom [51]. Let us posit the insurance industry as a potential stake-
holder that can access the data captured by the “VI-DAS car”. Insurers 
use the captured information about behavioural traits to penalize those 
who do not act in accordance to the insurers standards of low-risk. 
Following their aim of profit maximisation insurers can form a society 
characterised by manipulation that adapt human behaviour to the in-
surers standards [52]. Anomalous behaviour could be judged as defi-
cient and socially unacceptable [20] and thus the aim of the VI-DAS 
project to create a space of personal fulfilment is threatened. That’s said, 
Foucault’s insights strengthen the idea that it is vital to the VI-DAS 
project to ensure that behavioural data is governed and not misused 
for any other purpose than to optimize the communication between the 
human and the car. The emergence of harmful power relations must be 
prevented. 
Overall, using the traditional view of Benthamite surveillance and 
Foucauldian power relations allows a deeper and more comprehensive 
insight into the discussion of surveillance originated by VI-DAS 720-de-
gree observation. Nevertheless, there are both theoretical and practical 
limitations with the dystopian ideal of a central locus of power. It does 
not apply to the modern world of VI-DAS which is characterised by 
multiple panopticons crossing each other due to the large and complex 
network of stakeholders involved in the development of next generation 
of automated vehicles. Moreover, both theorems are limited by the fact 
that there exists no alternative to optimize HMI other than to capture in- 
depth information about the behaviour of the driver. Imagine a take- 
over situation between two humans in a car. Throughout the driving 
task it is vital for the one to constantly monitor the behaviour of the 
other and to know whether the other if able to take back control and 
operate the vehicle safely. Thus, considering the progressive develop-
ment of automated vehicles, the question that should be answered is not 
if surveillance is acceptable in this context. Rather, we should aim to 
understand the trade-offs of data sharing. We should figure out what 
data should be shared, with whom and to what ends. All this is important 
to avoid an intrusion of individual’s privacy and the emergence of 
harmful power relations. Consequently, we argue for a new way of 
thinking that adopts a multiple stakeholder perspective and distin-
guishes how drivers think about privacy to add value to the surveillance 
and privacy debate around automated vehicles. A major advantage of 
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this systemic multi-stakeholder approach is that it addresses profound 
ethical aspects that arise with the development of HMI technologies, for 
example in terms of (data) control, autonomy and the protection of 
privacy. Clearly, part of the problem here resides in the relative infancy 
of some of many of these practices and while we should not be tolerant 
of abusive practice or wholesale changes of power relation we would do 
well to bear in mind that we are in new territory [23]. In terms of re-
lations and the likely end-users of data derived from “in cab” insurance 
companies are an important part of the picture. The use of artificial 
intelligence (AI) by insurers is germane here and this for [53] “has many 
of the characteristics of other emerging technologies that make them 
refractory to comprehensive regulatory solutions”. The argument here is 
that the use of in vehicle AI may involve information flows across ju-
risdictions, from one set of professions to others groups of professionals 
and incorporates sets of practices that have not traditionally resided 
within the purview of the regulators. The use of AI also threatens certain 
characteristics of what many ethicists and philosophers take to be 
intrinsic to human beings including notions of dignity and autonomy. 
Such concepts do not fit comfortably into the current paradigm of 
financial regulation or indeed legislation governing transport. These 
issues has attracted some attention from the regulatory community and 
in 2019 EIOPA established the Consultative Expert Group on Digital 
Ethics in Insurance to inform public policy in this area.5 They had pre-
viously published a thematic review on the use of big data analytics in 
the motor insurance and home insurance markets where the issue of 
privacy was very prominent [54]. 
2.1. Nissenbaum’s framework of CI 
There is a degree of uncertainty around the question of how to 
operationalise the term ‘privacy’ implicit in level 3 and level 4 vehicle 
automation. As outlined in the Benthamite and Foucault section, albeit 
with some limitations, previous philosophical theories have tended to 
offer a profound understanding about the notion of surveillance as it 
refers to the current discussion around 720-degree observation. How-
ever, the main problem with both theorems is that they postulate an 
omnipresent power that forcefully collects all available information 
about a person. In the VI-DAS scenario, it is the user that shares 
behavioural information to secure an optimised and safe HMI during a 
hand-over and hand-back between manual and automated driving 
modes. We propose that to stop this flow of personal information ap-
pears restrictive and destructive for the future of mobility and our safety 
in level 3 and 4 vehicle automation. That said, the practical use-case of 
the VI-DAS hand-over scenario might help us to understand that it is not 
the necessary flow of personal data that defines a harmful intrusion of 
our privacy. Rather it is the misuse of this data that can discomfort the 
user and therefore needs to be regulated [51]. For this reason, this 
section assesses the issue of data privacy in a more user oriented 
perspective to broaden the ethical discussion around 720-degree 
observation and lend more context to the concept of privacy. 
In order to assess the issue of data privacy in a more user oriented 
perspective we refer to Nissenbaum’s framework of CI. In her timely 
article “Contextual Integrity Up and Down the Data Food Chain”, Nis-
senbaum provides a comprehensive overview of the theory of CI [25]. 
Moreover, she applied her theorem as a mechanism for explaining a 
multitude of privacy challenges related to her figurative expression of a 
data food chain. In this section, we aim to reproduce Nissenbaum’s four 
fundamental theses that carry the interrelated elements of CI. Then we 
work through the VI-DAS hand-over and take-over scenario to discuss 
the issue of privacy in a more context specific manner. The first theses of 
Nissenbaum’s framework of CI is that (1) privacy is determined by an 
appropriate flow of personal information. In her eyes, it is of no importance 
whether an information flow is generated or not. Instead, the concern of 
the framework of CI is whether the flow of personal information is 
appropriate in the given context. To answer the question as to which 
data flow can be described as appropriate we now need to move to theses 
two of Nissenbaum’s framework of CI. According to her second theses 
(2) appropriate flows conform with contextual-information norms (“privacy 
norms”). For a better understanding of the second theses let us think 
about our social lives where we individually or collectively interact with 
other. In those situations, our behaviour is normally governed by 
structured social settings that are defined by a multitude of factors such 
as internal values, power structures, norms or (social) rules. The often 
unspoken contextual values, aims, purposes, and norms a social combine 
to govern individual behaviour. A central argument of Nissenbaum is 
that among contextual norms, we can find those that regulate (i.e. shape 
or limit) personal information flows. These contextual-informational 
norms (rules) provide an explanation of why an insurance agent ex-
pects us to share comprehensive information about our health but not 
the stranger we just met on the street. Appropriate flows of personal 
information are defined by substantive normative dos and don’ts evident 
in distinct social contexts that influence our perception of privacy. 
Moving on, (3) Five parameters define privacy (contextual-informa-
tional) norms: subject, sender, recipient, information type, and transmission 
principle. The third theses of Nissenbaum’s theorem elucidates that five 
key parameters characterise context-relative informational norms. 
Senders and receivers of personal information flows can be single or 
multiple individuals or collectives like organisations. Let us stay with the 
given example of the insurance agent. In this scenario, the insured is the 
sender of the personal health information and the recipient is the in-
surance agent or hereinafter the insurance company. In many cases, the 
subject and sender of information are identical [24]. However, to specify 
informational norms it is always important to identify the roles of all 
actors in the given context. The nature of information (i.e. types of in-
formation involved) is another important parameter that needs clarifi-
cation. Let us return to our example of the insurance agent. In this 
scenario, the nature of information discussed are medical information 
about the status of (our) health. Ultimately, the transmission principle 
needs to be addressed within the framework of CI. This parameter, de-
scribes a contextual restriction of the flow of personal information that is 
shared between the sender and the recipient. More specifically, the 
transmission principle covers terms and conditions that govern the flow 
of personal information in a given context. In her book “Privacy in 
Context”, Nissenbaum gives an illustrative example for the context of 
friendship [24]. Among our friends, we normally anticipate that we 
share personal information voluntarily. We even tend to share very 
intimate information although we know that friends often draw their 
own conclusions that might not correspond to our own ideas our values. 
However, this openness and vulnerability is only possible due to certain 
relative or aggregative restrains. We share information reciprocally and 
suppose that our secrets will be handled confidentially. Nissenbaum’s 
last thesis posits that we need to ensure (4) the ethical legitimacy of pri-
vacy norms evaluated in terms of: A) Interest of affected parties, B) Ethical 
and political values, and C) Contextual functions, purposes and values. 
Think about social life. Normally our social life is characterised by a 
multitude of personal information flows between subjects, senders and 
recipients. These information flows are regulated by 
contextual-informational norms that have evolved over time. If we 
would now declare that only pre-existing contextual-informational 
norms can measure contextual integrity, then the framework of CI forces 
us to determine that many new technologies that violate established 
informational norms are problematic. Consequently, in the name of 
privacy we would refuse many novel but valuable technologies that are 
aimed to modify entrenched informational norms to achieve greater 
good. To impede a harmful conservativism, the framework of CI provides 
a way to demonstrate that a new practice is morally legitimate insofar as 
it promotes societal-welfare. For this reason, within the first two layers 
of fourth thesis, users of CI need to discuss interests and ethics as well as 
5 See https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/content/eiopa-establishes-consultative-e 
xpert-group-digital-ethics-insurance_en. 
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political values of a new information practice. Such a deliberation 
should answer - whose interests are served and how autonomy and 
freedom may be affected by the emergence of new power-relations. 
Finally, thesis four requires a distinctive contextual consideration of 
the new practice. Influenced by Regan [55]; the last layer critically re-
flects if the new practice infringes contextual purposes and values. At 
that point, it is important to understand that contextual purposes and 
values sometimes incur displeasure in the individual information subject 
or sender. A timely example is the ongoing discussion around the 
application of smartphone tracking in the current COVID-19 pandemic 
[56–58]. Not every individual might like to share information about 
current locations and contacts. However, a substantive advantage of this 
new practice is that it may allow us to prevent the further spread of the 
disease and thereby to protect human lives. 
2.2. Nissenbaum’s framework of CI applied to the VI-DAS scenario 
In this section, we aim to confront people’s moral and political point 
of view to the emerging information technologies as an integral element 
of automated vehicles. Therefore, we apply Nissenbaum’s framework of 
CI to the VI-DAS 720-degree observation scheme. As recommended, we 
carefully map out the personal information flows considering the five 
parameters of thesis three. Subsequently we assess interests, social 
values, contextual ends and values to determine the moral legitimacy of 
the VI-DAS 720-degree observation to ultimately refine our under-
standing of privacy in this practical scenario. 
Privacy is determined by an appropriate flow of personal information 
in a specific context. Before we can determine whether the flow of in-
formation is appropriate, we must get an in-depth understanding of the 
prevailing context and the new practice in terms of information flows. 
Every year, about 50 million serious accidents and 1.3 million fatalities 
result from traffic accidents worldwide [59]. Semi-autonomous vehicles 
at level 3 and level 4 are expected to provide significant reduction of 
anomalous events that increase the risk of a crash event [30]. However, 
McCall et al. [31] noted that details of a ‘minimised risk condition’ is not 
expanded to situations where the driver is unable to retake control. 
Moreover, liability regimes for this hybrid-human machine interaction 
in level 3 and 4 remain vague. For manufacturers of level 3 and level 4 
vehicles, the driver distraction poses a significant challenge [34]. It 
impedes the fluid relationship between the human and the car and 
therefore is critical for the driver’s safety during a hand-over [60]. 
A central element of the 720-degree observation of a “VI-DAS car” is 
the camera located over the dashboard. This camera scans the face and 
body of a driver and thereby gathers information about the driver’s 
physical, mental, and behavioural state. Furthermore, as it is a contin-
uous surveillance, data about mobile use [61] or other secondary tasks 
become visible [55]. Based on a combination of external data sets and all 
individual data gathered by the sensors of the vehicle, the system will be 
able to understand the overall driving situation including the behaviour 
of the driver. The information is needed for the system to reliably assess 
whether the driver is attentive and able to take over control of the 
vehicle in a societally acceptable and personalised manner (see Fig. 1). 
Fig. 3 pictures the practice in terms of possible data flows from the 
“VI-DAS car” to various stakeholders of the automated vehicle con-
sortium. A key element of this construct is the VI-DAS dataset. The 
dataset denotes an agglomeration of external datasets (i.e. naturalistic 
data, accident data) and progressively collected user and environmental 
data via the VI-DAS 720-degree observation scheme. The monitoring 
data flow is transferred to and stored in a cloud-based infrastructure 
wherein an informational norm has been developed regarding the 
acceptance of the uploading, storage and further uses of the data. Ma-
chine learning approaches are used to process the VI-DAS dataset in 
real-time to determine whether the driver is able to take back control or 
not. 
After we depicted the prevailing context and described the new 
practice in terms of information flows, Nissenbaum’s framework 
requires us to describe the five parameters that define privacy norms (i. 
e. subject, sender, recipient, information type, and transmission princi-
ple). In the VI-DAS scenario the information subject and sender is the 
user of the “VI-DAS car” who is monitored throughout the drive. All 
information is transferred to and stored in a cloud-based infrastructure. 
From there stakeholders of the VI-DAS consortium can access and pro-
cess data of the monitoring scheme. Fig. 3 gives a comprehensive 
overview about private and public sector stakeholders that are directly 
involved in the VI-DAS project. Among those stakeholders are the 
automotive industry, standards organisations, regulators, insurance 
companies, and the academic community. 
The automotive industry accesses the VI-DAS data to allow 
continuous optimisation of the performance and robustness of the 720- 
degree sensor technology. Thereby information about behavioural traits 
of the driver can be analysed to improve the installed surveillance 
technology. In addition, crash data will be made available to the tech-
nology supplier to reconstruct the crash situation since they are 
responsible for damages when the automated vehicle is at fault. Stan-
dards organisations process the VI-DAS data to specify and examine 
technological standards for implementation, functionality and testing. 
Regulators are involved as stakeholders in the VI-DAS project to pro-
vide recommendations around jurisprudence with a special focus on 
data and user protection. They will gain access to the VI-DAS data to 
monitor compliance on a recurring basis. Moreover, they will examine 
the impact and limitations of legal instruments such as the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [62] functioning as a fundamental basis 
(inside the EU) for the transmission of personal information in the digital 
age. The driver will also be able to access the personal data captured by 
the “VI-DAS car”. It will be possible to reconstruct trips and reconstruct 
individual behaviour. A special focus can be set on the issue of security. 
The user of the “VI-DAS car” can learn from such information about 
safety-critical situations and how to improve individual driving behav-
iour. Young drivers might benefit most from that technological 
improvement as they start to participate in road traffic at a stage when 
their driving skills are not fully developed. By providing information 
about the actual safety of the behaviour (e.g. speeding, dangerous cor-
nering) targeted feedback can offer young people the chance to develop 
their driving skills in a protected environment [63,64]. In addition, due 
to the 720-degree surveillance of the while driving environment the 
“VI-DAS car” can provide supportive information about how to handle 
hazardous situation. Thereby imminent crash events are likely to be 
prevented [65]. The academic community gets access to VI-DAS 
database to solve technological challenges of complex scene analysis 
or to research how to further improve trust relations between the human 
and the car to further optimize HMI. Furthermore, the academic com-
munity can access the information to identify challenges of data usage 
including ethical dilemmas and introduce those to the ongoing inter-
national academic discussion on these important topics. Lastly, the in-
surance industry is a key stakeholder in the VI-DAS consortium. Before 
addressing the issue of privacy within the context of 720-degree obser-
vation, we outline how insurers can use driver data with regard to an 
appropriate risk management process. Acting as a carrier and adminis-
trator of risks, insurers need to establish a certain degree of knowledge 
to assess risks [66,67]. Establishing such “risk knowledge” is pivotal for 
emerging risks as the full risk potential is unknown and can manifest 
many years later due to the possible time delay between the causation 
and manifestation of a claim [68]. Automated vehicles including level 3 
and level 4 are regarded as emerging risks. Therefore, insurers are 
interested in collecting data from highly automated vehicles to establish 
a sufficiently large data base for risk assessment. This generated “risk 
knowledge” enables the insurer to operate a more effective and 
pro-active risk management [69]. The VI-DAS project proposes a 
720-degree observation that gives the motor insurer additional infor-
mation to trace certain behavioural traits revealing the true risk expo-
sure of the driver. Nevertheless, the 720-degree observation poses new 
challenges in terms of HMI, such as a miscommunication between these 
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parties [70]. An efficient HMI requires adequate monitoring of the 
present driving situation and a faultless handover of the driving situa-
tion [2]. A failure or misunderstanding between the driver and the 
system can result in accidents with severe bodily injuries of both the 
driver and other road users. As motor insurers have to compensate 
justified claims arising out of these losses, they are interested in iden-
tifying the reasons for the inappropriate communication in the HMI as 
well as transforming this hazard into a calculable risk. By providing 
feedback to the driver, for example displaying safety-critical situations, 
the insureds may adjust their clients’ behaviour. Additionally, by dis-
playing certain limitations of the systems, the driver would become less 
reliant on systems leading to increased control characteristics [71]. 
The next step in Nissenbaum’s CI is to define the transmission 
principles of information that covers the terms and conditions that 
govern the illustrated flow of personal information in the hand-over- and 
take-over scenario. A prominent transmission principle is confidenti-
ality. In the VI-DAS context, confidentiality elucidates that the stake-
holder who received the VI-DAS data are not allowed to share this flow 
of personal information with other third-parties. That said, the volume 
and sophistication of cyber incidents has increased substantially in the 
last years. These include any risk emerging from connected digital sys-
tems being compromised, paralysed or attacked resulting in privacy and 
data breaches. Within the context of 720-degree observation, the po-
tential for cyber-attacks expands to in-vehicle sensors and thus driver 
status monitoring and understanding, including psychological and 
physiological state [72–74]. The sensitive data in the personalised driver 
model is a profound exposure and requires a holistic approach, including 
a dialogue between various stakeholders, to allow for a better under-
standing of the risk [73]. For example, insurers play a key role in rising 
awareness and advancing an environment that promotes an open and 
constructive engagement around cyber risk [75]. Other important 
transmission principles in the VI-DAS context depict that information is 
bidirectional and that an actor deserves to receive information, is enti-
tled or needs to know certain information and/or is obligated or 
mandated to disclose information [24]. Within the VI-DAS project, the 
flow of information is further governed by the corresponding General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [62]. In line with Article 5, the 
consortium has to inform the information subject about the purpose of 
data collection and needs the data subject’s explicit, free, and informed 
consent [76]. 
Based on Nissenbaum’s framework of CI, a prima facie violation of 
privacy takes place when the new technology violates the contextual- 
informational norms [24]. As discussed above, the automobile is 
characterised as a powerful (cultural) symbol of freedom, as a private 
space, a refuge from the outside world [14]. This perception of the car 
illustrates pre-existing contextual-informational norms that have 
evolved over time and can measure contextual integrity. Regarding the 
VI-DAS 720-degree observation, the camera gathers a myriad of data on 
the driver and the driving environment. Hence, at that point, we argue 
that the VI-DAS technology justifies a prima facie violation of privacy. 
However, at this juncture we must revert to Nissenbaum’s fourth thesis 
of CI. This last step prevents us from refusing to accede to potentially 
valuable technologies that are aimed to modify entrenched informa-
tional norms to achieve greater good in the name of privacy. As the 
emerging VI-DAS technology aims to facilitate in level 3 and 4 vehicles, 
we now further assess the legitimacy and moral acceptability of the 
proposed 720-degree observation technology to determine whether this 
kind of surveillance constitutes a threat to privacy. 
With reference to the 720-degree observation of VI-DAS, the driver is 
aware of the use of monitoring technology to secure a hand-over from an 
automated to a manual driving mode. One could argue that the trans-
parency resulting from constantly monitoring the driver behaviour leads 
to a limitation of freedom insofar as it limits the free development of 
personality due to the constant feeling of being watched [77]. By 
contrast, it appears reasonable that the feelings triggered by technolog-
ical surveillance may not last a long time, implying that drivers get used 
to the VI-DAS technology and retain an adequate level of subjective 
individual freedom. That said, it is only a short step to develop highly 
granular profiles over time that can be easily supplemented with in-
formation offered by Big Tech.6 Those user profiles can then be further 
leveraged to nudge or manipulate a driver, for instance, to buy addi-
tional warranty options or other products offered by the manufacturer. 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that manufacturer may access the infor-
mation to fend off warranty claims citing abnormal driving behaviour. 
Without proper safeguards, government employees can also misuse 
personalised data to track individuals or use the data for law enforce-
ment purposes [78]. A contemporary example is provided by the Chi-
nese authorities. They harness the power of personal data to create a 
Social Credit System that punish or reward citizens according to certain 
standards of behaviour determined solely by the ruling authorities 
[79–81]. Similarly, the driver of the “VI-DAS car” could access 
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Fig. 3. Practice in terms of possible information flows from the level 3 and level 4 vehicle to various stakeholders.  
6 Big Tech is a name given to the largest information companies that domi-
nate the information technology industry. These companies include Amazon, 
Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. 
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information form the cockpit to track passengers or to reconstruct con-
versations. Using young drivers as an example, parents can use the in-
formation to track their children’s every move [82], monitor 
conversation with peers, and increasingly control their children’s 
everyday behaviour. Lastly, the insurance industry as one key stake-
holder of the VI-DAS consortium can use the data about behavioural 
traits to financially penalize perceived abnormalities [7,83–85]. 
Thereby we may not only run into danger that motor insurers limit in-
dividual freedom [86]. All these negative side-effects can have major 
implications for the principles of human dignity and personal autonomy 
and can also violate the principle of justice [76,86]. In addition, we risk 
that harmful power imbalances occurring with the misuse of the VI-DAS 
surveillance machine that becomes particularly concerning when no other 
options for mobility exist [76]. However, by contrast to the potential 
downsides, the VI-DAS 720-degree observation does offer a set of posi-
tive expectations including collision avoidance and increased safety. In 
that regard, Haidt characterised care (and harm) as one of the founda-
tional principles for moral reasoning [87,88]. The ability to navigate 
safely and smoothly though road traffic is the ultimate desired perfor-
mance outcome of the “VI-DAS car”. Without integrating monitoring 
technologies like the VI-DAS 720-degree observation, a safe take-over 
and hand-over scenario seems unfeasible. 
2.3. Recommendation 
Based on the information displayed above, in the specific context of 
the 720-degree observation to optimize HMI to enhance the driver’s 
safety, we argue in favour of the emerging technology as it maximises 
pleasure on a micro- and macrosocial level. However, taking the myriad 
of personal data into account, we need to make sure that an appropriate 
flow of personal information will be secured by the VI-DAS consortium 
itself and corresponding legal regimes beyond the GDPR. For the VI-DAS 
consortium, one could think about creating a Code of Conduct (CoC) for 
the protection of the user’s privacy. That agreement, on binding rules of 
data usage behaviour for all stakeholders of the consortium must ensure 
that the generated data flows are solely used to enhance a safe HMI 
between the driver and the vehicle. In that regard, we think that it is 
fundamental that the compliance with the CoC is regularly assessed by 
ethical groups that are independent form the VI-DAS consortium and 
mainly focused on protection of the user’s data. In addition, we should 
keep in mind that the CoC is a document containing important infor-
mation not only for the management of a company but also for every 
single employee that may have access to sensitive user information. 
Moreover, a team responsible for privacy protection must ensure by 
regular training events and that the CoC is widely communicated. Both a 
CoC for the socially acceptable use of personal information by the VI- 
DAS consortium and corresponding legal regimes could additionally 
be used to create a protective ethical layer for the VI-DAS dataset as 
illustrated in Fig. 4. That layer should prevent that data being seen as 
simply an asset that needs to be turned into value in terms of capital. 
Other experts [89,90] have discussed the configuration of a Firewall to 
prevent the misuse of personal data streams. A Firewall is a network 
security application that monitors incoming and outgoing flows of in-
formation and blocks specific data flows based a set of security rules. In 
the context of the VI-DAS 720-degree observation scheme, that set of 
security rules can be defined by an independent, multi-disciplinary body 
that ensures an appropriate flow of personal information following 
Nissenbaum’s framework of CI. With this multidisciplinary perspective, 
we do not lose sight of the point that notions of privacy, autonomy and 
individuality are different from culture to culture [23]. With this in 
mind, we should now think about future qualitative research projects 
that aim to determine the necessary set of security rules for personal 
data protection that include a cross-cultural element. 
In terms of policy recommendations, whilst accepting the privacy has 
always been a relative concept and for generations there has been trade- 
off between the general welfare and privacy of the individual there are 
still reasons to adopt something of a cautious approach. In terms of 
governance, within both OEMs and insurance companies (for example) 
there needs to be a risk governance process that throws light on these 
new practices and allow for an interrogation of new practices. Early in 
the VI-DAS project we came upon a research ethics issue of some import – 
that of accidental findings. In the case that the technology might identify 
a health issue with a driver of a prototype car, the question was how 
such data should be shared and the driver informed. In a commercial 
environment where we witness the coming together of OEMs and in-
surance companies to leverage data from level 3/4 vehicles, such issues 
will re-emerge on a much larger scale. Policy makers need to get ahead 
of this and a failure to do so could result in a decline in public trust and 
Fig. 4. Illustration of a protective ethical layer that ensures that the personal flow of information is solely used to ensure and improve a safe hand-over and take-over 
between the human and the vehicle. 
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ultimately political problems around the societal acceptance of the 
rollout of these technologies. Hence, although a primary aim of projects 
such as VI-DAS is to reduce road accidents and hence is beneficial for 
society, public perception and acceptance depend partly on how per-
sonal data is protected and processed. Accordingly, a reliable framework 
comprising ethical principles is emerging as an important precondition 
for of the introduction 720-degree observation. 
3. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper is based on the idea of 720-degree observation posited by 
the VI-DAS project. As the driver is constantly monitored by a camera 
located over the dashboard, in some respect there are echoes of the 
Benthamite paradigm. From there, it is a relatively short step to radical 
Foucauldian critiques that combine concerns about power and tech-
nologies of surveillance. Both traditional surveillance theorems allow 
for a deeper and more comprehensive insight into the dangers inherent 
in terms of surveillance in the context of VI-DAS 720-degree observa-
tion. Nevertheless, Benthamite and Foucauldian thinking appears too 
general and high level to answer the question who should have access to 
the recorded data and how the data should be used by stakeholders of 
the VI-DAS consortium. 
As our paper suggests, there are more stakeholders than governments 
or state actors relevant to the VI-DAS consortium. In some ways, the 
insurance industry is a notable example of a disciplinary power in so-
ciety utilising surveillance techniques in order to exercise control of 
human agents. However, the disciplining power of the insurance in-
dustry should not be perceived as purely negative. A favourable example 
can be seen in the use of telematics technologies that allows feedback to 
facilitate better driving. That is particularly relevant in the group of 
young novice drivers which are more likely to be involved in a crash or 
near-crash event [91–93]. In addition, there are more advantages, which 
should be pictured at this point, one could also consider the potential 
benefits for older drivers and those with mobility issues, hence moni-
toring technologies like the 720-degree observation system to optimize 
HMI are not simply the stuff of dystopian nightmares. 
However, there are risks to be addressed and data flows to be gov-
erned. Consequently, while Benthamite and Foucauldian thinking is 
useful in a heuristic sense and provides a good starting point in terms of 
interrogating the value of this emerging technology. However, we do 
need a way forward in terms of developing protocols for managing 
privacy and sensitive data to overcome inherent limitations. Nissen-
baum’s theorem of contextual integrity provides a deeper insight into 
the current debate on privacy aspects specific to HMI. The introduction 
of her contemporary decision heuristics and incorporating the prevalent 
context into the debates to evaluate the appropriateness of personal data 
flows allowed us to broaden the ethical discussion around 720-degree 
observation and to operationalise our understanding of privacy in a 
more context specific fashion. Overall, Nissenbaum’s CI moved our 
debate beyond a more binary discussion on privacy and surveillance and 
to a certain degree escape the shadow of the panopticon. Most impor-
tantly, Nissenbaum allowed us to introduce structure and a degree of 
precision in our thinking on the matter of privacy what represent a step 
forward in that regard. For this reason, we propose to researchers and 
practitioners to utilize frameworks like those of Nissenbaum to generate 
a contextual understanding of the intrusion of privacy through present 
and future information technology. This may help us to determine so-
cially acceptable and appropriate flows of information using a more 
user-centric perspective than previous philosophical approaches 
allowed. 
Zuboff [7] and others have identified some of the more macro-risks 
at play in this new paradigm of date sharing. The wider context is one 
in which large global companies are seeking to gather – without re-
striction – information on citizenry in a manner that has no precedent 
historically. The last thesis of Nissenbaum’s decision heuristic adapted 
to the information age provides a way to measure whether a new 
practice is morally or politically superior (or inferior) might help miti-
gate some of the associated ethical problems. However, finally we 
should keep in mind that the framework of CI does not present a magic 
bullet, nor does indeed Nissenbaum claim it to be such. We conclude 
with a quote from Van den Hoven, Lokhorst, and Van de Poel [94]; 
“Ethics can be the source of technological development rather than just a 
constraint and technological progress can create moral progress rather 
than just moral problems.” 
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[83] P. Händel, I. Skog, J. Wahlstrom, F. Bonawiede, R. Welch, J. Ohlsson, M. Ohlsson, 
Insurance telematics: opportunities and challenges with the smartphone solution, 
IEEE Intell. Transport. Syst. Mag. 6 (4) (2014) 57–70, https://doi.org/10.1109/ 
MITS.2014.2343262. 
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